Dear friends,
Entering this week, the Middle East is full of false starts, cautious hopes, and dialogue.
Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks have once again faltered and collapsed over demands for Hamas to disarm, with attempts once again to restart talks underway. Gazan protests against Hamas have continued. Last week, I wrote on Substack what is fueling the protests and the wider impact of the rare public dissent in Gaza.
After positive progress in Rome on Saturday, with US-Iran nuclear talks are entering their third week. Low-level indirect talks between Turkey and Kurdish separatists are slowly churning along.
Which brings me to Iraq.
I have spent a week in Iraq, listening to citizens’ hopes and concerns. Here, a people and a nation are watching and cautiously cheering on the talks, teetering between hope and bracing for the worst.
The region’s talks come, as one senior Iraqi politician described to me, “Iraq is moving from an era of instability to a new era of permanent stability.” Across Iraq there is a building boom—from housing to factories to roads.
At the Sulaimani Forum, a gathering of policymakers and experts from across Iraq and the region at the American University of Iraq- Sulaimani in Sulaimaniyeh, Kurdistan, there was cautious optimism that with ongoing dialogues, an era of regional powers using Iraqi soil as a battleground for their confrontations may soon come to an end.
This hope is lifted up by two pillars.
One is the government of Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani and its focus on providing services and encouraging investment, providing a tentative feeling of stability and predictability for average Iraqis.
The second pillar is a series of concurrent diplomatic breakthroughs and détentes: Kurds and Turkey, Iran and the US, Syria and Iraq, the Syrian government and Syrian Kurds, Tehran reported willingness to rein in its militias as it looks inwards.
Of these parallel dialogues, a US-Iran talks breakthrough would have the largest impact on Iraq.
Iraq is reliant on Iranian natural gas, receiving a sanctions waiver from the US that ended in February as part of the Trump Administration’s maximum pressure campaign, leaving Iraq facing an energy crisis.
A US-Iran agreement would not only free up Iraq to import Iranian energy, but the increased money to Iran’s coffers would almost immediately boost Iraq’s trade with Iran, its largest trading partner.
An end to Iraq being a proxy staging ground to attack US and Israel—and bear the brunt of US military strikes—would improve not only security, but create the stability needed for economic development and foreign investment.
The start of low-level talks between Kurdish separatists and Turkey also bodes well for Iraqi stability and security.
The PKK and other Kurdish militants have been operating in the hinterlands of Iraqi Kurdistan, inviting devastating Turkish airstrikes—the most recent retaliation last October.
The focus on Turkey-Kurdish tensions has been a drain on resources and bandwidth in Iraqi Kurdistan, with militant activity depopulating hundreds of villages and threatening oil fields.
Solving these parallel crises would allow Iraq to move forward.
Which is why the Iraqi government has been shuttling between the US and Iran voicing its support for the talks and Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani has been engaged in his own quiet diplomacy between Turkey and Kurdish groups, calling for an end to their enmity.
Should US-Iran or Turkey-PKK talks collapse, Iraq may once again be the target of regional powers’ military escalations.
But for now, in Iraq, Spring’s hope is eternal.
What I’m Hearing
With the threat of war looming, Iran’s beleaguered proxies are stepping back and demobilizing, bracing for potential US military strikes.
The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces are enjoying a renewed independence and agency, filling the space left by a declining Hezbollah on the country’s southern border with Israel.
With the prospect of US-Israel attacks on Iran, Hezbollah is reportedly withdrawing its fighters and missiles from position in southern Lebanon, a strategic standing down, further emboldening the Lebanese Armed Forces. Meanwhile, interim Syrian government forces on the other side of the border are dismantling Hezbollah’s arms smuggling routes—putting added pressure on the movement.
In Iraq, contradictory reports state Shiite militias have been prepared to follow suit and demobilize. The outlier remains Kitaeb Hezbollah, which has denied media reports of its willingness to disarm and remains at the ready should Iran wish to activate them to strike at the US and Israel.
What I’m Watching
I am currently watching Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordanian security services announced last week that it had busted an allegedly Brotherhood-linked militant cell producing missiles and drones at the outskirts of Amman.
Observers say the cell was an attempt by Hamas to open an Eastern front in its fight with Israel. It marked the second military activity directly or indirectly tied to the Brotherhood, Jordan’s largest opposition movement, in the last six months.
The weeks ahead will see increased calls within the state for Jordan to curb the Brotherhood, which currently has 31 seats in parliament and represents the chamber's largest bloc. Some hawkish elements within the government are reportedly pushing Jordan to withdraw the movement’s license, dissolve parliament and ban the Brotherhood.
But moving against the Brotherhood at a time public outrage over Gaza is high and pro-Hamas sentiment is prevalent could prove perilous. Ever patient, the Jordanian state may wait months—perhaps even after the Gaza war concludes—to neutralize the Brotherhood.
Until then, the relationship between the Jordanian government and the country’s largest political party will be fraught.
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